Ibn Rushd al-Hafid’s position on analogical reasoning (qiyās) through an analytical and comparative study

Abstract

This research explores Ibn Rushd al-Hafid’s position on analogical reasoning (qiyās) through an analytical and comparative study, aiming to reveal the nature of his conception of this central juristic principle, and to what extent he agrees or disagrees with mainstream Usuli scholars from the Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, Ḥanafī, and Ẓāhirī schools. The significance of the topic stems from the pivotal role that qiyās plays in Islamic legal reasoning, as well as from the distinguished intellectual stature of Ibn Rushd, who combined expertise in jurisprudence, legal theory, philosophy, and Aristotelian logic. The study seeks to answer the central research question: What is Ibn Rushd’s understanding of qiyās, and how does it compare to the classical definition, pillars, conditions, authority, and practical applications held by the majority of scholars? The research also addresses sub-questions related to his interpretation of the concept, classification, and epistemological status of qiyās within the broader structure of legal reasoning. The study adopts an analytical-comparative methodology, analyzing Ibn Rushd’s major works—Bidāyat al-Mujtahid, al-Ḍarūrī fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, and Faṣl al-Maqāl—and comparing them with the views of scholars from other schools. The findings show that while Ibn Rushd largely aligns with the majority on the foundational principles of qiyās, his integration of Aristotelian logic lends his approach a distinct rational and philosophical dimension within the field of Islamic legal theory.